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The Curious Case of Jia Junpeng, or The Power of Symbolic 
Appropriation in Chinese Cyberspace 
October 20, 2009 in blogging, China Behind the Headline by The China Beat | 3 comments 
This essay was originally presented at New Media and Global Transformations, a conference that took 
place at Columbia University on October 9, 2009. It has been adapted for China Beat. 
By Guobin Yang 
An Uncanny Story[1] 
On July 16, 2009, an anonymous internet user in a popular Baidu discussion forum posted a message 
titled “Jia Junpeng, your mother wants you to go home to eat.” The message has only twelve Chinese 
characters in its title and has no other content. Yet it got 3,000 responses within five hours, responses 
that range from the routine socializing type (“Support!” “Interesting!”) to the funny and sarcastic (“I 
am not going to eat at home today. I’m eating in the Internet bar. Please pass on my message to my 
mom.”). Within one day, it received seven million hits and 300,000 comments. Large portal sites like 
sina.com, netease.com, people.com and newspapers like Southern Metropolis began to cover it, 
adding to its popularity. A cryptic posting was thus turned into a national media event. Jia Junpeng 
became a household word in Chinese cyberspace overnight. 
No one knows who posted the message or who the Jia Junpeng in the message is. In their responses, 
many people doubted whether the Jia Junfeng in the posting refers to a real person. The name might 
just have been made up by whoever posted the message. 
As people were puzzling over this bizarre phenomenon, two new developments happened. First, 
several business firms claimed that the Jia Junpeng event was the product of their online 
marketing.  The CEO of a new media firm, for example, alleged in early August that the entire event 
had been created by his firm. He claimed that his firm had hired over 800 marketing personnel, who 
then registered over 20,000 user IDs to post responses to that cryptic sentence, thus turning it into a 
national media event. None of these firms has released evidence to prove their claim. It is possible 
that their real marketing strategy is to try to get some share of the media limelight by making a 
sensational claim. Even if these claims are unsubstantiated, however, they do suggest that it is 
possible to manipulate or manufacture public sentiments in cyberspace. 
The story does not end here. Just one day before the Jia Junpeng message appeared, a blogger by the 
name of Guo Baofeng was detained by local police in the town of Mawei in Fujian province. Guo 
Baofeng was accused of using his blog to spread rumors about local police. At the police station, he 
secretly sent a text-message asking for urgent help: “I have been arrested by Mawei police. SOS.” 
Upon receiving this message, his friends started campaigning for his release. Inspired by the Jia 
Junpeng posting, one well-known blogger called on people to send postcards with the phrase “Guo 
Baofeng, your mother wants you to go home to eat” to the police station where Guo was detained. 
The address of the police station was posted online. This created a “postcard movement.” Some well-
known names in the Chinese blogosphere began sending postcards to Guo Baofeng through the post 
office (whether they reached Guo is another matter). Similar messages were posted in online forums. 
Although it is not clear how much this postcard movement might have helped, Guo Baofeng was soon 
released. 
It is mind-boggling that such an innocuous short sentence could generate so much interest and then 
was appropriated in rather surprising ways. What does it tell us about new media and social 
transformation in China? 
I think the main message is that in China today, the internet can always be appropriated by users for 
their own purposes, however closely it is monitored or controlled. Much more than the newspaper and 
television, the internet depends on user participation. Bulletin boards, blogs, video web sites, social 
networking sites all depend on users to contribute content if they are to survive. As long as this 
feature does not change, internet users can always make creative or subversive use of it. 
Why do people appropriate the Internet? 
The Jia Junpeng case shows that there are both general and specific reasons that users appropriate 
the Internet. At a general level, their appropriation of Internet forums and spaces is a reflection of 
social sentiments. Chinese commentators point to the sense of alienation and isolation in 
contemporary life. Many responses to the Jia Junpeng posting express feelings of boredom. One post 
says, for example, “What I am posting is not a post. I am posting loneliness.” Other social sentiments, 
such as nationalism, patriotism, and anger with corrupt officials have also electrified Chinese 
cyberspace from time to time. 
Specific reasons for appropriating the internet vary a great deal. In the Jia Junpeng case, Chinese 
observers have remarked that it was at least partly an outpouring of frustration by members of that 
particular online forum. The forum is set up for players of the popular game World of Warcraft. At that 
time, the parent company of World of Warcraft, Blizzard Entertainment, had just selected netease.com 
as its new China representative. In preparing to launch the game, however, netease.com had 
encountered difficulties in obtaining a license. On June 30, 2009, Netease issued a public statement 
apologizing to consumers for the delay in launching the game. This was frustrating to the members of 
the forum. Thus, the Jia Junpeng posting became an occasion for expressing their frustration. This 
would seem to suggest a kind of consumer activism – people appropriated the Jia Junpeng message to 
express their dissatisfaction as consumers of a popular internet game. 
Users also appropriate the Internet for political purposes. This is what happened when the Jia Junpeng 
phrase was later used by Chinese bloggers to call for the release of activist-blogger Guo Baofeng. At 
that point, an innocuous and cryptic phrase turned into a potent political slogan. 
It is well known that the Internet is closely monitored and controlled in China. How can people use it 
for subversive purposes? 
The issue is not simply a matter of citizen expression versus state control, or freedom versus 
repression, though these are of central importance. Even during more controlled periods such as the 
Cultural Revolution, there were what Tang Tsou calls “zones of indifference” which state power did not 
try to penetrate or control. In some ways, cyberspace is easier to control. A vast online community, 
for example, may be monitored from a small central control office. Entire networks can be shut down. 
Yet this does not mean Chinese cyberspace does not have its own “zones of indifference.” Gaming 
communities, like the one where the Jia Junpeng case happened, are less of a concern for state 
authorities than online forums on current affairs. In Chinese cyberspace there are also issues of 
indifference to the state – everyday-life issues that do not touch on the state’s central nerve systems. 
The Jia Junpeng posting is such an issue (if it is an issue at all). Yet as often happens in Chinese 
politics, it is through these zones and issues of indifference that people begin to make difference. 
There exists only a thin line between matters of indifference and difference. 
Moving beyond the state-society framework, we will also need to look at the multiple dimensions of 
the Internet – its economics, culture, society, as well as politics. The government is not the only 
player in this game. There are other players as well, especially commerce and community. Internet 
businesses have a vested interest in encouraging user participation. Online communities are an 
essential component of all major commercial web sites, because they help to build a user base and 
attract web traffic. Commercial and social forces thus provide favorable conditions for user 
participation. 
Why are some internet postings transformed into major media events, while numerous 
others attract no attention at all? 
Here the Jia Junpeng message poses the ultimate challenge. Does it make sense that such an 
apparently pointless phrase should instantly go viral in Chinese cyperspace? On the internet in the US, 
for example on YouTube, there are also postings or videos that occasionally go viral. Although analysts 
have puzzled over such phenomena and business firms have picked up the concept of viral marketing, 
no one knows yet why, when, and how a YouTube video or internet posting will go viral. 
It seems to me that Internet postings become popular and are widely circulated for the same reasons 
that folk sayings, folk songs, legendary tales, rumors, or even forbidden books have always been 
circulated. These popular cultural forms often enjoy no official support. In fact, state authorities often 
try to suppress them. And yet they have always managed to find their way into society and enjoy wide 
if sometimes surreptitious circulation. 
The reasons are more social than technological. After all, folk sayings and rumors, which are 
traditionally among the fastest to spread, are low-tech cultural forms. They circulated by word of 
mouth or relied on primitive media forms (such as hand-copied manuscripts during China’s Cultural 
Revolution). 
Most cases of popular Internet incidents in China, like the Jia Junpeng case, are fairly low-tech by the 
standards of rapidly developing digital technologies. They happen mostly in online bulletin board 
systems. People occasionally use cell phones to post messages in online forums. There are sometimes 
postings of digital images. But most interaction consists of text-based BBS postings. BBS is a dated 
form of network service in the US, but in China it is still a major platform for online interaction. Blogs 
and social networking sites are catching up, but their influence still pales in comparison with BBS. The 
main reason for the sustained popularity of BBS in China is history and culture. Generations of 
Chinese Internet users, whether they are high school students, college students, or urban 
professionals, started with BBS when they first went online. As a result, there has formed a rich and 
dynamic culture of BBS that encourages participation. There is even a form of competitive 
participation as people try to outdo one another in their jokes. 
Another social factor that helps to explain why some postings go viral is the issue under discussion. 
The Jia Junpeng case is exceptional in the sense that the original posting did not have a clear issue 
(only the forum members knew they were angry with the delayed launch of their favorite game) and it 
was in the middle of interaction that people attached issues to it. In less exceptional but equally 
popular cases, the issues usually resonate with the public. They are often emotionally stirring. They 
typically concern blatant violations of law and the norms of social morality, such as corruption or 
violence inflicted on the poor and the vulnerable the rich and powerful. Cases like the death of Sun 
Zhigang in 2003 or the abduction of teenagers into slave labor in 2007 immediately come to mind. 
These and other similar cases pressured government authorities to take action after provoking public 
uproar. 
Finally, one must not underestimate the power of play in online interaction. Play is a social act, an 
essential ingredient for community. Many responses to the Jia Junpeng message are sexual jokes, 
jokes about family life, workplace relations, school life, and so on. People compete to see who is 
funnier. Such playfulness is typical of Chinese Internet culture in general – recall how Chinese netizens 
have recently played with the Grass-Mud Horse or the Green Dam Girl. There is evidently also 
abundant play in the case of Jia Junpeng and the postcard movement. 
Play is also a creative act. The social history of the Chinese Internet in the past ten years is a history 
of play. Indeed, it is a history of growing playfulness. In content, design, and style, today’s web sites 
in China are a world apart from those in the late 1990s. In the early 1990s, when Chinese students 
overseas began to run Internet magazines, those magazines did not look very different from the print 
magazines they had been familiar with. Today, it is hard to imagine how many different forms Internet 
publications have morphed into. When personal homepages were in fashion in the late 1990s, people 
were publishing their personal diary entries, a predecessor of today’s blogs. Yet even a cursory 
comparison will show how much more playful today’s blogs are compared with the web diaries in the 
“primitive” days of the Internet. And of course, for those who do not often go online, Chinese Internet 
culture presents a different kind of challenge – there is a whole new language that netizens have 
invented in the process of play, a language that makes little sense to those who do not partake in the 
play. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration to say that the main features of Chinese Internet culture today 
are the products of a history of play. 
All this is to say that the seemingly curious case of Jia Junpeng is not so curious after all. A pointless 
phrase does not go viral in cyberspace for no reason. I am not saying, though, that the circulation of 
an Internet posting is the same as that of a rumor or folk saying in earlier times. The Internet differs 
in one crucial aspect. It changes the speed and scale of communication. When large-scale 
communication happens rapidly, the speed of social transformation quickens and the frequency of 
transformative events increases dramatically. Consequently, it creates a more acute sense of 
immediacy and urgency in our consciousness of current affairs. 
This has both positive and negative consequences for political action and critical analysis. This sense 
of urgency demands immediate action against violations of law, morality, and our sense of social 
justice. It demands instant results. This is of vital importance. Yet I also wonder at times whether this 
sense of urgency and immediacy, by fanning our desire for instant results, may not be guilty of 
creating a sort of myopia. By focusing our attention on the possibilities and prospects of overnight 
transformation, it makes us forget that the seeds of dramatic institutional transformation are often 
planted in the small changes in everyday life.  Such a myopic view little aids our efforts to gain a more 
sophisticated and historical understanding of the complexities, multiple zones, and  uncanniness of 
Chinese Internet culture and politics. 
Yang Guobin is an Associate Professor of Asian and Middle Eastern Cultures at Barnard 
College.  He is the author of the recently published book, The Power of the Internet in China: Citizen 
Activism Online. 
 
[1] Author’s note: For the use of the term “uncanny,” I am indebted to Lydia Liu, “The Freudian 
Robot: The Figure of the Uncanny in New Media.” Talk at the conference on “New Media and Global 
Transformation” on October 9, 2009, Columbia University. 
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